The employment will drop the most in the sectors which are affected most by the new environmental regulation. Sectors which do not depend much on SO 2 emissions may use more employment thanks to the lower wages. Overall, however, the employment and the disposable income of the people living in the reforming region will drop. As the productivity slows down, the returns on capital also drop, and there is less appetite for investment. The environmental policy also makes energy more expensive reducing its use.
Whether the prices of capital or energy will change significantly, depends, among others, on the structure of the import and export markets of these goods and the market power of the local production. Typically, regions are small and their unilateral policies do not influence much the prices of international goods markets. As the environmental regulation raises the production costs, especially of the SO 2 polluting sectors, the reforming region will loose its share on the national and international good markets. Export of SO 2 -intensive goods will drop.
Overall, the environmental regulation causes a decline of the regional economy. Hence, the tax bases of regional and federal taxes also shrink and this leads to lower tax revenues for all government levels (Saveyn and Proost, 2005) .
Typically, the main effects of tighter SO 2 emissions in a reforming region are -Lower wages -Less labor supply -Lower output for SO 2 intensive sectors -Lower demand for capital and investment for SO 2 intensive sectors -Lower export for SO 2 intensive sectors -Less tax revenues by the federal and regional governments
The preceding discussion corresponds with a "command-and-control" policy or grandfathered permits.
Economic literature, however, explains that not only the level of the environmental target, but also the choice of instruments has important efficiency and distributional effects on the economy (e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Goulder et al., 1999) . The choice for environmental taxes or subsidies causes a redistribution of income across the SO 2 polluting sectors, the non-polluting sectors, households and the various governments. Moreover, the use of the excess tax revenues of pollution taxes also affects the efficiency of the economy. In general, the economic literature recommends lowering pre-existing distorting taxes as labor or capital taxes. Typically, the highest efficiency gains can be obtained when the tax rates with the highest Marginal Cost of Public Funds 5 are lowered. In contrast, if the financing of the environmental subsidy needs higher distorting tax rates, the efficiency of the economy will deteriorate as well.
Inter-Regional Effects
Although the other regions in the same federal state do not change their environmental policy, they will still feel the environmental and economic effects of the single reforming region. The non-reforming regions will react to these effects causing feedback effects to the reforming region and the economy of the federal state.
The effects of SO 2 as a pollutant are mostly local. Nevertheless, the neighbors of the reforming region will also feel the new environmental regulation as less SO 2 will be deposited within their borders.
The other regions do not reform their policy and, hence, do not exogenously change their production costs. The production costs of the non-reforming regions, however, will be altered endogenously as the unilateral policy of the reforming region changes the price of labor, capital and goods on the common markets. The lower demand for employment and the lower wages in the reforming region cause commuting towards the non-reforming region such that the wages are equalized across all regions. The arrival of commuters in the non-reforming regions lowers the wages, and these lower wages boost the demand for employment. Saveyn (2006) explains that, indeed, commuting alleviates the wage decrease in the reforming region, but causes lower wages in the non-reforming regions.
Commuting exports a part of the costs of environmental policy of the reforming region. Similarly, lower energy and capital prices may boost the demand in the non-reforming regions. However, the lack of power of the reforming region on the international market will limit these effects.
The shares of the regions on the goods markets will change. The non-reforming regions may expand their share of SO 2 -intensive goods to the detriment of the region pursuing the environmental reform.
Sectors in the non-reforming regions may also export more as they can benefit from cheaper inputs as labor.
A last effect will be felt through the tax revenues and public services of the various government levels.
As their economy will change, the tax revenues by the regional governments will also alter. Moreover, as explained in Saveyn and Proost (2005) , a regional environmental reform may cause vertical externalities, affecting the public consumption by the federal government 
THE STRUCTURE OF BELGIUM
First, we explain the federal structure of Belgium. Further, we present the data corresponding to the federal structure of Belgium. 
Federalism in Belgium
Since the 1970s five reforms of the constitution 6 have transformed Belgium into a federation with increasingly more autonomy for the three regions and three communities. The three regionsFlanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital -are responsible for geographically related issues as environment, road infrastructure, and land management, whereas the three communities -Flemish, French, and German -deal with personally related issues as culture and education. The borders of 6 The timing of the various reforms was 1970, 1980, 1988-1989, 1993 and 2001-2003 . Each institutional reform resulted in a higher degree of autonomy for the lower levels. Unfortunately, they also made the relations between the government levels increasingly complex. In our analysis, we lump the communities with the three regions for the sake of simplicity.
(a) Federal Government and Social Security
The federal budget and social security account for 24% and 39% of the total budget for all Belgian governments, respectively. The main tax revenues are corporate taxes, direct taxes on the income of the inhabitants, capital taxes and value-added taxes. Moreover, two environmentally related taxes remain on the federal level: the energy excises, which are the main environmentally related taxes, and environmental consumption taxes on e.g. batteries, razor blades, plastic and carton bottles, etc. The contributions and expenditures of the social security remain mostly on the federal level. Social services provided by the lower government levels are included in their budget.
(b) Regions and Communities
The aggregate budget of the regions and communities corresponds to 24% of the Belgian total of government budgets. Today, the fiscal autonomy of the Belgian regions is rather small. The regions are competent for a number of smaller taxes, with the inheritance taxes, property taxes and car taxes being the most important. In 1988 the regions became competent for the main environmental issues 7 .
However, the regions only set some non-energy environmental taxes (manure, waste disposal, etc).
A large share of their budget is financed through transfers from the federal level. These transfers to the lower government levels are financed from the federal personal direct income tax and VAT revenues. The redistribution is pretty complicated and based on the number of students in the community and the regional origins from the personal direct income tax revenues. The transfers are absolute amounts and they evolve independently from the collected tax revenues by the federal government.
(c) Municipalities and Provinces
The municipalities and provinces finance their budgets (13% of the Belgian total) mainly with taxes (47%), transfers from other government levels (20%), dividends and revenues from services. The two 7 The federal level remains responsible for product norms, protection against radiation and transport of waste.
main taxes, a property tax and a tax on the direct income of their inhabitants, represent about 40% each of the tax revenues. The remainder taxes have very diverse tax bases and are not significant if aggregated. In our analysis the municipalities and provinces are lumped with the regions and communities.
Data
The main constraint of the regional analysis is the lack of regional SAMs, providing a complete circular flow of regional income and expenditures through inclusion of the household, industrial and government sectors.
In our analysis, we used the SAM for Belgium (1995) and regionalized the Belgian IO using the regional distribution of the added value of the sectors. The investment, private and public consumption use the respective figures in the regional accounts. Export and Import are kept on the national level.
The tax revenues are allocated to the relevant government level using the shares in Table 1 .
The direct taxes include the corporate taxes, direct personal taxes, capital taxes and inheritance taxes.
The indirect taxes include, among others, the pre-existing environmental taxes. Initially, we distribute the regional taxes, such that the regional tax rates are identical across the regions.
Further, we use the environmental data (including the abatement costs) of the EU-25 GEM-E3 model. The environmental data for the NEC pollutants are based on the RAINS model 8
. For all regions we use the emission coefficients and abatement cost curves available for Belgium in EU25 GEM-E3. We do, however, take into account the more administrative and less energy-intensive characteristics of the mainly emitted by burning fossil fuels. The most important sectors for SO 2 and NO x emissions in Belgium are electricity facilities, petrol refineries, chemistry, ferro and non-ferro. Most NH 3 emissions are generated by livestock production. The latter has more short-range effects compared to the former two.
Acidification is a cross-border issue, requiring coordinated initiatives across countries and sectors. In
Flanders, 57% of the acid deposition comes from neighboring countries, whereas Flanders itself is a net exporter of acidifying components. The 1990s saw the SO 2 emissions drop substantially in the EU, thanks to a combination of European Directives forcing the installation of desulphurization systems and the move away from coal as a fossil fuel, and major economic restructuring in the new German
Lander. Nevertheless, acidification is still a major environmental problem in Europe, but the NO x and NH 3 deposits have become relatively more important.
The NO x and NH 3 emissions also contribute to the eutrophication of the environment. Eutrophication is the enrichment of land or water ecosystems with chemical nutrients, and is considered a form of pollution because it promotes plant growth, favoring certain species over others and forcing a change in species composition.
Ozone (O 3 ) has the same chemical structure whether it occurs miles above the earth or at ground level and can be "good" or "bad," depending on its location in the atmosphere. "Good" ozone occurs naturally in the stratosphere and forms a layer that protects life on earth from the sun's harmful rays. In the earth's lower atmosphere, ground-level ozone is considered "bad". Ozone is not emitted directly into the air, but at ground level is created by a chemical reaction between oxides of nitrogen (NO x ) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) in the presence of sunlight. Transport and industrial emissions, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents as well as natural sources emit NO x and VOC that help to form ozone. Sunlight and hot weather cause ground-level ozone to form in harmful concentrations in the air.
As a result, it is known as a summertime air pollutant. Many urban areas tend to have high levels of "bad" ozone, but even rural areas are also subject to increased ozone levels because wind carries ozone and pollutants away from their original sources.
(d) NEC in Belgium
The emission ceilings in the NEC Directive are the result of political bargaining on the EU-level. Table   2 represents the emission ceilings in the NEC Directive (NEC) and those in the original proposal of the European Commission (NEC+). The emissions in the NEC Directive are less stringent than those in de Commission proposal. Belgium is a net exporter for most emissions to its neighboring countries. Therefore, the Belgian effort is among the highest in the EU (Table 2 ). This is due to the central location of Belgium, and the fact that the country and its neighbors are very densely populated with a high concentration of emissions.
Moreover, the choice of national emission ceilings means that the bigger countries have a larger choice of potential emission reductions.
Within Belgium, inter-regional burden sharing agreements split the federal emission levels into emission levels for the three regions (Table 3 ). Each region is responsible for its own emission ceilings. However, measures at the federal level may be needed to comply with regional emission ceilings. The emission ceiling for transport remains at the federal level. The Belgian emission ceilings are the sum of the emission ceilings of the three regions and the emission ceiling for transport. 
Scenario Description
We compare six scenarios to a reference scenario. Scenario (i) and scenario (ii) analyze the climate policy and NEC policy separately. Scenarios (iii) to (vi) combine both environmental policies. However, they differ in the choice of environmental instrument and the responsible government level. Scenarios Here, Belgium complies with its commitments for climate policy using national permits. In 2010 its CO 2 -emissions are 7,5% lower than in 1990. There are no NEC initiatives..
(ii) Scenario 2: National NEC policy -No Climate Policy
Belgium introduces a NEC policy on the federal level with national permits. There is no Climate Policy.
(iii) Scenario 3: National Climate and NEC Policies using National Permits
Belgium uses national permits for its climate and NEC policies.
(iv) Scenario 4: National Climate and NEC Policies using National Environmental Taxes Belgium uses national environmental taxes for its climate and NEC policies. The federal government earns the environmental tax revenues.
(v) Scenario 5: Regional Climate and NEC Policies using Regional Permits
The regional governments are responsible for the environmental policy within their borders. They use regional permits for their climate and NEC policies.
(vi) Scenario 6: Regional Climate and NEC Policies using Regional Environmental Taxes
The regional governments are responsible for the environmental policy within their borders. They use regional environmental taxes for their climate and NEC policies. The regional governments earn the regional environmental tax revenues.
Results
For the six scenarios, we discuss the effects on the environment, sectoral output, employment and commuting and tax revenues and tranfers of the various government levels. All relative changes (in %) are w.r.t. the reference scenario. Similarly, scenario (ii) does not impose explicitly any constraints on the NEC pollutants. Still, we observe important reductions for SO 2 (-21%) and NO x (-19%). However, NH 3 and VOC show smaller but still significant reductions (-1% and -5%, respectively). We conclude that the reduction of NEC pollutants is an important ancillary benefit of climate policy. Although none of the scenarios impose specific restriction on PM 10 emissions, we observe significant reductions for PM 10 in all scenarios. The climate policy of scenario (i) leads to a reduction of more than 7%. The NEC policy of scenario (ii) reduces the PM 10 emissions with almost 9%. Combining both environmental policy in scenarios (iii)-(vi) leads to 11% less PM 10 emissions. We conclude that the reduction of PM 10 emissions is an important ancillary benefit of both the climate and NEC policies. Table 5 gives an overview of the marginal abatement costs (euro/ton) for the various pollutants for the six scenarios. The very high abatement cost for VOC (at least 80000 euro/ton) can be explained by the fact that the concentrations of VOC emissions are very low. E.g. refueling a car only emits a few grams VOC whereas driving should not emit more than 140g/km 11 . Hence a ton VOC corresponds to a much higher degree of economic activity. The ancillary benefits between the NEC policy and climate policy are well reflected in the marginal abatement costs. The marginal cost of CO 2 reduction is much higher in climate policy scenario (i) than 11 An agreement between the EU and the car manufacturers states that cars should not emit more than 140g/km in 2008.
(a) Environment
in scenarios (iii)-(vi) where both environmental policies are combined. Similarly, the marginal costs for SO 2 and NO x are higher with only the NEC policy in scenario (ii) than in scenarios (iii) to (vi). As the climate policy reduces the SO 2 and NO x emissions with about 20%, the NEC policy considerably, the NEC policy only has to deal with an additional 10% reduction instead of the target of minus 30%, resulting in lower marginal abatement costs. The difference in marginal abatement costs between scenarios (ii) and (iii) to (vi) are much less significant for NH 3 and VOC, reflecting the lower ancillary benefits between these pollutants and climate policy ( Table 4 ). The marginal cost of CO 2 reduction is zero in scenario (ii) as there is no constraint on CO 2 emissions. Similarly, the marginal costs for the NEC pollutants are zero in scenario (i).
In the national scenarios (iii) and (iv) the abatement costs are identical across the regions. For the regional scenarios (v) and (vi), the abatement costs are not equalized. From a perspective of Belgium, the national scenarios are more efficient. The differences in regional marginal abatement costs may be due to the sectoral composition in each region. Table 6 summarizes the change in output for 4 aggregate sectors and six scenarios.
(b) Output
Obviously, the energy and energy-intensive sectors are most strongly affected by both environmental policies. The interactions and ancillary benefits between climate policy and NEC policy are also clearly reflected in Table 6 . The climate policy of scenario (i) reduces the output of the energy sectors with 5%
in Belgium. The NEC directive of scenario (ii) reduces solely the energy output with almost 16%. The combination of both policies in scenarios (iii)-(vi), however, reduces the energy output with almost 17%. In other words, adding the climate policy to the NEC directive reduces the energy output only with 1% more. Similar observations can be made for the energy-intensive sectors, the goods and services. In all four sectors, the output seems to reduce more with the NEC directive than with the climate policy, reflecting the fact that the NEC directive is relatively more expensive compared to climate policy for 2010.
As its economic activity generates less pollution, Brussels has a comparative advantage to the other regions and attracts more activity due to environmental policy. Although one can expect a shift from industrial output to administrative output (e.g. emission trading) these results for Brussels are not very realistic. Our model may improve by dropping the "perfect substitution assumption" for Brussels and consider the "administrative output" of Brussels as a complement for the "industrial output" of the other regions. In scenario (i), the output of the energy-intensive sectors in Brussels also increase as its benefits from the relatively cheaper energy. Table 7 represents the effects of the environmental policies on the sectoral and regional employment. The effects of Table 7 correlate strongly with the effects observed for the output in Table 6 . The energy and energy-intensive sectors are most severely affected, whereas the employment in the service sector hardly shows a decline. Similarly as the output, the employment of the energy sectors also increases in Brussels. Again, the employment decreases much more for the NEC policy than for the climate policy. The employment decrease for both policies combined is hardly higher than for the NEC policy alone.
Interestingly, the employment decreases more for both tax scenarios (iv) and (vi) than the other sectors. This higher decline in employment may be due to the fact that people are less inclined to work as they receive higher social benefits trough the tax recycling. With a higher income people are less willing to work.
About 43% of the people working in Brussels come from the other regions. In Flanders about 6,5% of the active people work in Brussels, whereas for Wallonia this figure is 16%. These figures are relatively stable for the various environmental policies and scenarios. 
In Saveyn and Proost (2005) it is explained that environmental policy on the regional level may have important consequences for the budget of the federal level. In this analysis we find that regional environmental policy (scenarios v and vi) leads to lower tax income on the federal level. Obviously, this effect is most significant for the pre-existing federal environmental taxes. The federal government loses about 8% of their initial environmental tax revenues due to climate and NEC initiatives by the three regions. However, the federal government loses also non-environmental tax revenues due to the regional environmental policies, albeit the effect is rather small (-0,4%).
We assume that the total of monetary transfers from the federal government to the regional governments is identical for all scenarios
12
. One of the main determinants to redistribute the transfers is the regional origin of the direct income tax revenues
13
. However, the changes in transfers across the regions are very small, as both the climate policy and the NEC directive affect all regions. A unilateral policy of one region may lead to more significant effects on the intergovernmental transfers.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we develop a Regional General Equilibrium Model for Belgium. We start from the EU 25 GEM E3 model and introduce regional characteristics as inter-jurisdictional commuting, a common product market and intergovernmental transfers.
We illustrate the use of this model with an analysis of the climate policy and NEC directive in Belgium and its three regions. The simulations show that this model is suitable analyzing the effect of environmental and energy policies on the regional emissions and the regional marginal abatement costs, the regional effects on the sectors, the regional employment and the budgets and transfers of the governments.
Overall, our results show that there are important ancillary benefits between the NEC policy and climate policy. These ancillary benefits work in both directions and also on pollutants, which are not explicitly included in either policy. We conclude that combining both environmental policies simultaneously results in the environmental target for a bargain price. The interactions and ancillary benefits between climate policy and NEC policy are also reflected in the output of the energy and energy-intensive sectors, which are most strongly affected by both environmental policies. The output seems to reduce more with the NEC directive than with the climate policy, reflecting the fact that the NEC directive is relatively more expensive compared to climate policy for 2010. The employment follows the same sectoral evolution as the output, and the various environmental scenarios do not change the inter-regional commuting significantly. However, we find negative vertical externalities on the federal budget when the regions are responsible for environmental policy. Finally, we find that the effect of the environmental policies on the monetary transfers between the government levels is very limited.
The use of this model highly depends on the availability of regional SAM data, regional data on emissions, and data on the intergovernmental relations. In the current analysis, the available data was very poor, and our analysis was often based on strong assumptions. This data deficiency limits the scope for a thorough regional analysis, as the conclusions may be the results of artifacts (e.g. the higher output in Brussels for energy sectors). If more data is available this regional general equilibrium model may become a powerful tool to measure the regional effects of federal or regional environmental and energy policy. The model also allows for unilateral regional policies or for regions not choosing the same environmental targets or instruments.
Besides the data limitations, other improvements to the model can be made. The current analysis is done as if only Belgium has to comply with the climate and NEC policies. In reality, all EU Member
States have to take initiatives in for climate and NEC pollutants. Hence, the current analysis can be considered as the upper bound of the economic effects.
Although the (regional) GEM-E3 model is initially built for the analysis of environmental policies, it can also contribute to other socio-economic policy questions. 
